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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, once the world's largest creditor nation in
1981, with net foreign assets of $141 billion, became its largest net
debtor nation in 1986, with net external debt of $264 billion.1 This
reversal in net foreign assets of over $400 billion was caused by a series
of ever widening current account deficits principally stemming from
deepening trade deficits, its major component.' In 1987, the global
* Member of the Bar of British Columbia. LL.B. (University of Toronto 1983);
Ph.D. (Economics, Queen's University, Ontario, 1982).
1. Looking Beyond America's Means, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1987, at 76. See
also U.S. Debt to Rest of World Doubles to $236 Bn in 1986, Financial Times, June
24, 1987, at 1.
2. A trade balance reflects the aggregate of merchandise trade of a country. A
trade deficit (surplus) occurs when its imports exceed (do not exceed) its exports. A
current account balance is a broader concept, incorporating trade in goods, but also in
invisibles, such as insurance, transportation, tourism, investment income, fees and roy-
alties and other services. A current account deficit (surplus) occurs when the aggregate
of merchandise trade and invisibles is negative (positive).
(39)
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trade deficit of the United States was a record $171.2 billion.3 Al-
though recent statistics provide promising indications that this deficit
will not become larger in 1988," the still slow pace envisaged for reduc-
ing these unprecedented deficits leaves the prospect that the net exter-
nal indebtedness of the United States will be in excess of $700 billion
by 1990,5 perhaps fifteen percent of the GNP, and one trillion dollars
by the early 1990's.1
Japan has had a large bilateral trade and current account surplus
with the United States for the previous eight years.7 In 1987, the trade
deficit reached a record of $59.8 billion, the largest in absolute terms of
any American trading partner.8 Although this trade deficit barely in-
creased in 1987, 9 as compared to significant increases for the three pre-
vious years, 10 the prospects for a quick, significant reduction in this bi-
lateral deficit, let alone its elimination, like that of the global trade
deficit, remain unlikely. Yet, arresting the growth of this deficit has
been a major accomplishment in itself, reflecting as it does a rather
inadvertent combination of several approaches undertaken by both U.S.
and Japanese authorities in the past few years, some of which will be
discussed later.
This article will focus on the approach initiated by the U.S.-Japan
Financial Accord,11 which was executed on May 29, 1984, to restruc-
ture Japanese financial markets, and augmented in part by other mea-
sures which either stem directly from the Financial Accord or are con-
sistent with those of the Financial Accord. This approach, in large part,
3. This trade deficit reflected imports of $424.1 billion and exports of $252.9 bil-
lion in 1987 (as compared to a deficit of $156.2 billion and exports of $226.8 billion).
December Trade Deficit Lowest Since January 1987, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, Part
I, at 1.
4. The December merchandise trade deficit of $12.2 billion was lower than the
November deficit of $13.2 billion, and the October deficit of $17.6 billion, reflecting
record exports of $24.8 billion, and steady imports of $37 billion. Although the trade
gap for the United States improves in November and December, many analysts attrib-
uted the improvement to the devalued U.S. dollar. See id.
5. Looking Beyond America's Means, supra note 1.
6. Well, Would You Debit It?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1987, at. 73.
7. Jameson, U.S. Trade Deficit Eases But Friction with Japan Goes On, L.A.
Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at 1.
8. Id.
9. In 1986 the bilateral trade deficit was $58.6 billion. Id.
10. The bilateral trade deficits for 1983, 1984 and 1985 were $21.8, $30.7 and
$43.6 billion respectively. Id.
11. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FINANCE - U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY WORKING
GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF TRLASURY, REPORT ON YEN/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES
(1984) [hereinafter FINANCIAL ACCORD].
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sought to readjust the yen-dollar exchange rate to make the terms of
trade more favorable to the United States, and to a lesser extent, facili-
tate the entry of American and other foreign financial institutions to
Japanese financial markets. Section II provides a brief outline of the
other concurrent approaches to the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. Sec-
tion III provides a brief history of the Financial Accord and its three
major objectives. Section IV discusses the Financial Accord and subse-
quent measures to liberalize domestic Japanese financial markets. Sec-
tion V covers measures to internationalize the yen, and Section VI re-
views measures taken to improve the access of foreign financial
institutions to compete in Japan.
II. OTHER APPROACHES
The United States has adopted several approaches toward reduc-
ing its trade imbalance with Japan, often in a common front with many
of its trading partners. An early and often recurrent approach today
involves trade conflicts over specific commodities and even entire indus-
tries in which the United States has a trade deficit. In many cases, the
resolution of these trade conflicts involved invoking GATT machinery
to clear away perceived unjust trade practices.12 In other cases, the res-
olution involved the imposition of quotas on the import of specific com-
modities, and even requesting the Japanese producers to exercise volun-
tary export restraints to the United States. For example, in the
automobile trade, Japan has had a trade surplus both in the volume
and value of cars for many years. 3 In 1981, a "voluntary" export re-
straint program for automobiles began, in order to give the U.S. auto
industry time to recover from its slump."4 Although the initial ceiling
increased as domestic sales of the U.S. auto industry improved, the
ceiling of 2.3 million autos remained unchanged in 1988, in large part
due to a sensitive period in U.S.-Japan economic relations, when with
strong and comprehensive trade legislation pending, many have called
for a lowering of Japan's export ceiling.15 Other trade conflicts, for in-
12. For instance, see Shibayama, Beef, Orange Talks Go before GATT; Japan
Still Seeks Political Settlement, JAPAN ECON. J., May 14, 1988, at 1, 3. See also
Political Trade Issues, Marketplace Reality - U.S., Japan to Heed GATT Ruling,
Eliminate Chip Price Monitoring," id. Apr. 9, 1988, at 2.
13. Japan Plays It Safe, Extends Symbolic Car Export Quota, id., Feb. 6, 1988.
14. See generally Leo, An Update of the Japanese Automobile Export Restraint,
8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 159 (1982). See also Japan Plays It Safe, Extends 'Symbolic'
Car Export Quota, JAPAN ECON. J. Feb. 6, 1988, at 2.
15. Japan Plays It Safe, Extends 'Symbolic' Car Export Quota, JAPAN ECON. J.,
Feb. 6, 1988, at 2.
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stance, have been waged over machine tools and semiconductors,"6 with
ongoing and incipient conflicts in the Japanese agricultural and public
works industries.1 7
Another approach has been the restructuring of the Japanese
economy in order to dismantle, in large part, the export-oriented indus-
trial structure with which Japan has been so successful. To achieve this
goal, there must be fewer incentives for Japanese producers to export
goods and greater incentives for consumers to save less and consume
more goods, both domestic and foreign-made. 8
This approach has recently been the focus of several Japanese au-
thorities. In April, 1987, Haruo Mayekawa, a former governor of the
Bank of Japan, recommended in the New Mayekawa Report submitted
to the Nakasone government that in order to promote the smooth re-
structuring of the Japanese economy, a moderated GNP growth rate in
the economy was necessary, with a higher growth rate in domestic de-
mand to counterbalance a lower rate in external demand. 9 More re-
cently, the Japanese government led by then Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita committed itself in the Fall of 1987 to a mid-term economic
plan emphasizing domestic-demand oriented growth in order to reduce
current account surpluses." This plan has been based in part upon the
the New Mayekawa Report 21 and the economic report covering fiscal
1983-90,22 in which prime importance was given to administrative re-
form aimed at streamlining government and which the new plan will
replace.
The new economic plan was sent to the Economic Council, an ad-
16. For machine tools, see Googins & Greene, The Industrial Targeting Practices
of Japan and the Domestic Machine Tool Industry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469
(1983); for semiconductors, see generally Chesser, Semiconductor Chip Protection:
Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249 (1985).
17. For instance, the latest dispute in the agricultural industry involves a dispute
over beef and citrus import quotas which Japan has maintained. The latest talks on this
issue involved Japanese Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries Minister Takashi Sato
meeting with U.S. Agriculture Secretary Richard Lyng, and others March 29, 1988.
See Japan, U.S. Set Minister, - Level Beef, Citrus Talks, JAPAN ECON. J., Apr. 2,
1988, at 4. Also, the countries are in dispute over foreign enterprises having access to
major government and non-government construction projects. See Construction Re-
mains Barrier, id.
18. See Reich, Why is America Losing the Economic Race with Japan?, id. Apr.
26, 1986, at 7.
19. Expand Import Demand-Editorial, id. Dec. 12, 1987, at 26.




visory body to the Prime Minister, to determine its framework. 3 In
January, 1988, the Council recommended, inter alia, a drastic adjust-
ment of the economy, converting it into a domestic demand-led econ-
omy in the next five years, with an acceleration of the growth of domes-
tic demand, and lowering that of external demand."'
A third approach, which supplements and is part of the approach
of the Financial Accord and which has been implemented in conjunc-
tion with monetary authorities in other countries, has been to coordi-
nate monetary policies to affect domestic interest rates, and to realign
the various foreign exchange rates in order to affect the price terms of
international trade. An earlier manifestation of this approach occurred
on September 22, 1985, when, pursuant to the Plaza Accord, Japan,
West Germany, France, the United Kingdom and United States
launched a coordinated effort to correct their huge external trade im-
balances by intervening in the foreign exchange markets to reduce the
massive overvaluation of the dollar and undervaluation of the yen and
deutschemark, and to foster more rapid growth of domestic demand in
Japan and Germany. 5 This approach, aided in part by the Financial
Accord measures, was extremely successful in persuading the foreign
exchange markets that the dollar was overvalued and that the govern-
ments and central banks should coordinate their policies to bring about
a downward realignment.26 The dollar depreciated precipitously against
a number of currencies, including the yen, which appreciated alone in
the period of September, 1985, to May, 1986, from 242 yen per dollar
to 170 yen per dollar.27 The problem with this approach is that once
the realignment process was underway, it was often difficult to prevent
market forces from causing a further, unwanted deterioration of the
U.S. dollar without having subsequent currency intervention by central
banks.28 For instance, the February, 1987, Louvre Accord of the G-7
23. Id.
24. Council Advises Takeshita to Reduce Trade Surplus, Raise Quality of Life,
id., Jan. 16, 1988, at 13.
25. Chira, Pressure on Japan in Dollar Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1985, at DI,
D6.
26. "Japan Adopts Measures To Counter Strong Yen," Washington Post, May
31, 1986, at GI col. I.
27. See id.
28. It seems that before the lagged effects of the "i-curve" can take effect, the
dollar is further devalued, restarting the "i-curve" cycle. The "i-curve" refers to the
process whereby a devaluation of a currency leads to a worsening of a country's trade
accounts in the short-run, and its improvement in the long-term. When a country's
currency is devalued, the price of imports increases, and the price of exports falls.
Without changes in the volume of imports and exports, the value of imports increases
19881
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(the United States, the United Kindom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy
and Canada) sought to arrest the decline of the dollar vis-a-vis other
currencies in order to provide a stable exchange rate for the dollar,
including a yen-dollar target zone of 140-160.29 Later, in response to
the over-sized correction of stock markets globally in October, 1987,
the G-7 declared their intentions to coordinate dollar-supporting inter-
ventions based on a negative-target zone, which would peg the dollar at
a lower level than the Louvre Accord."° In addition, Japan and the
U.S. had entered into agreements to restore currency rate stability, one
of the most recent of which was executed during the January 13, 1988,
summit in Washington."1
This process of rectifying trade imbalances through the foreign ex-
change markets has come under criticism from a number of quarters.3 2
For instance, the Bank of Japan, in a report entitled "Review and Out-
look of World Economy" which was released on January 8, 1988,
warned that too much emphasis was being given to the temporary mea-
sures of monetary policies to address trade imbalances.3 3 It suggested
that longer-term policies, such as the restructuring of the economies of
surplus countries to reduce their dependence on the demand from other
countries for exports, and the reduction of domestic demand of deficit
over the value of exports, and the trade account worsens. Over time, a country's con-
sumers and producers and those of its trading partners will substitute higher cost for
lower cost traded goods. Moreover, as a result of the devaluation, the country's con-
sumers and producers will have less real income with which to purchase imports, and
those of its trading partners, will have greater real income to purchase its exports. As a
result, the country will export more and import less, and despite the lower price for its
exports and higher price for its imports, the trade account will improve, and eventually
move from a decreasing deficit to an increasing surplus. In addition, the country's sur-
plus trading partners will find attractive the economic factors for relocating production
facilities in the deficit country, causing hitherto imports of the deficit country to be-
come domestically produced, reducing its trade deficit, and also causing a "hollowing-
out" of the industrial structure of the surplus country. However, the process underlying
the "J-curve" takes time, and every time the process is set in motion for a certain
exchange-rate alignment, the dollar is further devalued, the trade adjustment dynamics
becomes more complex. As a result, the ultimate impact on the trade deficit becomes
uncertain, and the expected improvements are deferred further making the trade ac-
count deficit deeper, thereby deferring the remedial effects of the processes underlying
the "J-curve."
29. Dollar-Supporting G-7 Pact Reflects U.S. Fear of Another Stock Crash," JA-
PAN EcON. J. Jan. 16, 1988, at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Japan-U.S. Dollar Pact Welcomed, but Efficacy Remains in Question, id. at
5.
33. BoJ warns Monetary Policy Alone Can't Fix Trade Gap, id. at 14.
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countries, were required.3 '
From another quarter, the devaluation of the dollar is the wrong
approach in that classical trade theory, upon which the realignment of
foreign currency exchange rates to vary the terms of international trade
is based, is no longer credible because international markets in goods
are managed and no longer free and competitive."5 The solution to this
changed structure of international trade lies in subsidizing exports, re-
stricting imports, and targetting domestic industries for expansion in a
scramble for shares of stagnant world markets.36
III. HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FINANCIAL ACCORD
The financial authorities of the Japanese Ministry of Finance
("MoF") and the United States Department of the Treasury jointly
issued the "Report on the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Issues" ("Finan-
cial Accord") on May 29, 1984."7 While the Financial Accord reflected
an ostensible quid pro quo between the interests of Japan and the
United States, the larger part of its substance was devoted to U.S.
points of interest and the corresponding obligations of the Japanese.
These obligations were threefold: 1) deregulation of domestic financial
markets, especially "Regulation-Q" type constraints on interest rates
for deposits; 2) internationalization of the yen; and 3) greater access of
American and foreign financial institutions to the Japanese financial
services industry.38
Initially, the U.S. supported only the two objectives of interest rate
liberalization and the internationalization of the yen. In October, 1983,
Lee Morgan, Chairman of Caterpillar Tractor, and leader of the Busi-
nessman's Round Table, a prestigious business trade organization, in-
formed President Reagan that due to a misaligned yen/dollar exchange
rate which left the yen undervalued, hundreds of U.S. companies, in-
cluding his own, were losing billions of dollars annually in domestic and
international orders to Japanese competitors. 9 Morgan cited the Mur-
chison-Solomon Report,10 the principal conclusion of which was that
34. Id.
35. Erdman, Only Mutual Trust Can Avert Economic Disaster, id. at 23.
36. Id.
37. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11.
38. See generally id. § V.
39. Katz, Industrial Policy Implications of Japan's Credit Structure is More Im-
portant than Yen Rate," JAPAN ECON. J., May 8, 1984, at 20.
40. MURCHISON & SOLOMON, THE MISALIGNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOL-
LAR AND THE JAPANESE YEN: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION (Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University, Sept. 19, 1983).
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the undervaluation of the yen was primarily the consequence of Japa-
nese financial policies that made the yen both difficult and undesirable
for foreigners to obtain."1 Morgan recommended that the United States
encourage the Japanese Government to adopt the detailed list of tech-
nical changes in Japan's banking and financial laws provided by the
Murchison-Solomon Report."2
During the economic summit in Tokyo on November 9-11, 1983,
President Reagan addressed the issue of the yen-dollar misalignment,
and pressured Japan both to internationalize the yen and to liberalize
its domestic capital markets."3 Following the Nakasone-Reagan sum-
mit, the then Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita and U.S. Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan, having met to discuss specific proposals to
cure the yen-dollar misalignment, announced several financial measures
designed to effect the principle that "open, liberal capital markets and
the free movement of capital are important to the operation of an effec-
tively functioning international monetary system.4'
In order to monitor the execution of these measures and imple-
ment additional ones, a joint, ad hoc Working Group was established to
study the yen-dollar exchange rate issues."5 During its six meetings be-
tween February and May, 1984, the Working Group expanded and
clarified the American demands for the liberalization of the Japanese
domestic financial market and the internationalization of the yen."
The third objective of the Financial Accord, the greater access of
American and other foreign financial institutions to the domestic Japa-
nese financial services industry, arose during the Working Group dis-
cussions in 1984 when the MoF rejected a proposed joint venture be-
tween Morgan Guaranty Trust Bank and Nomura Securities to
participate in the trust business, particularly in the lucrative manage-
41. Id. at 21-22.
42. The authors of the Murchison-Solomon Report proposed six measures to re-
move artificial curbs on the demand for yen, including elimination of interest rate con-
trols and constraints on short-term financing. See id. at 36-38. In subsequent negotia-
tions with the Japanese Government, many of these changes were adopted.
43. Japan-U.S. Summit Talks, ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, Dec. 1983, at 2.
44. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT, TREAS. NEWS I
(Nov. 10, 1983).
45. Id. at 3. The official name of the Working Group is The Japanese Ministry of
Finance-Department of the Treasury Group on Yen-Dollar Exchange Issues.
46. During the Working Group discussions, the U.S. emphasis shifted from the
Murchison-Solomon demands of deregulating Japanese money and capital markets to
the deregulation of the Euroyen market. See Kondoh, The Yen Dollar Commissions
Report and MoF Prospects, in STUDY ON THE TOKYO CAPITAL MARKETS 24 (Japan
Center for International Finance Policy Study Series No. 2).
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ment of corporate pension trusts."7 The MoF strongly opposed the joint
ventures between foreign banks and domestic financial firms that were
not licensed to participate in the trust business in large part because of
the historical separation in Japan between trust and commercial bank-
ing.' 8 However, the perception of the United States and other foreign
countries was that the MoF was unfairly restricting the entry of foreign
financial institutions into the domestic activities of the domestic finan-
cial services industry. As a result, several measures aimed at improving
the access of foreign financial institutions to the Japanese industry were
incorporated into the Financial Accord.
IV. LIBERALIZATION OF JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS
In the negotiations leading to the Financial Accord, the Working
Group proposed to liberalize Japanese financial markets by deregulat-
ing short-term interest rates, easing restrictions on the issuance of cer-
tificates of deposit, and creating new financial instruments. 9 These
three measures were designed to increase the amounts not subject to
interest rate controls." The economic rationale behind these proposals
is that interest rate deregulation would cause Japanese interest rates to
reach a higher level than they otherwise would under the contempora-
neous domestic monetary policy, and in turn, would stimulate foreign
investment in Japanese financial instruments and would discourage
Japanese investment in foreign financial instruments. Thus, the.deregu-
47. In June, 1983, Morgan Guaranty Trust Bank and Nomura Securities pro-
posed to operate a joint venture for the management of pension trust funds in Japan.
See Finance Minister Proposes OK To Nomura Morgan Plan; Says It's Long-Range
Issue, JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 20, 1984, at 2. At the time of the Nomura-Guaranty
proposal, other joint ventures were proposed between Citicorp and Daiwa Securities,
Chemical Bank and Yamaichi Securities, and Bank America and Nikko Securities. See
Citicorp Plans to Enter Trust Business in Japan, id. Jan. 10, 1984, at 1.
48. Katz, Industrial Policy Implications of Japan's Credit Structure Is More Im-
portant than Yen Rate, id. May 8, 1984, at 20.
49. See infra, notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
50. In Japan, under the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law [Rinji Kinri
Chosei Ho], Law No. 181 of 1947, the MoF is authorized to control interest rates on
deposits. This deregulation has had significant effects since being introduced. For in-
stance, the lowering of minimum denominations on time deposits to 100 million yen not
subject to interest rate controls has increased the balance of deposits 2.7 fold in a year
to 43 trillion yen. In addition, the lowering of the minimum denomination of new finan-
cial instruments, called money market certificates ("MMCs"), to 10 million yen, has
increased this instrument's balance of deposits to 15 trillion yen by the end of 1987,
when a few years earlier, MMCs did not exist. See Deregulating Savings, id., Mar. 12,
1988, at 25.
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lation of interest rates would diminish capital outflows from Japan and
appreciate the yen vis-a-vis the dollar.
The MoF agreed to deregulate interest rate ceilings on large de-
nomination deposits within two to three years, and to consider the re-
moval of ceilings on small denomination deposits.5 1 The schedule for
interest rate deregulation on large denomination deposits was intro-
duced in July, 1985, as part of the Action Program for Improved Mar-
ket Access, pursuant to which interest rates on deposits in excess of one
billion yen were to be deregulated in October, 1985,52 and those in ex-
cess of 500 million were to be deregulated in April, 1986.53 Interest
rates on deposits in excess of 300 million yen were deregulated in Sep-
tember, 1987, 5 and those in excess of 100 million yen were deregulated
in April, 1987.1' The MoF also planed to lower the minimum denomi-
nation of large scale time deposits to thirty million yen by October,
1988.56
In addition, the pool of financial instruments not subject to interest
rate ceilings was expanded with the liberalization of the restrictive con-
ditions underlying the issuance of certificates of deposit ("CDs") by
commercial banks, a power permitted since 1979.11 These measures en-
tailed lowering the minimum denomination on CDs, enlarging the ceil-
ing on each bank's issuance of CDs which had been restricted to a
multiple of shareholder's equity, and, shortening the minimum matur-
ity on CDs.58
The creation of new financial instruments occurred in March,
51. See FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(A).
52. GOVERNMENT-RULING PARTIES JOINT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PROMOTION
OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC MEASURES, THE OUTLINE OF THE ACTION PROGRAM FOR IM-
PROVED MARKET ACCESS 24 (July 30, 1985) (provisional translation available from the
U.S. Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter THE OUTLINE OF THE ACTION PRO-
GRAM]. The Action Program of July 30, 1985, is the seventh such program undertaken
to correct trade imbalances between Japan and its trading partners. Reforms were pro-
posed in six different areas including Japanese financial and capital markets. See Inter-
national Trade: Reforming Japanese Trade Policy, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295, 295-96.
53. R. JONES, CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN JAPAN 6, 9 (Japan Economic
Institute Report No. 8(A), 1986).
54. Liberalization Draws Horde of Cash Into Money Market, JAPAN ECON. J.,
Mar. 19, 1988, at 3.
55. Id.
56. Ministries Delay Freeing of Small Deposit Rates, id. Mar. 19, 1988, at 15.
57. Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (Jotosei Yokin No Toriatsukai Ni Tsuite,
Kura Gin No. 650 of Mar. 30, 1979). The interest rates on CDs are not subject to
regulation under the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law. Id.
58. See FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(A).
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1985, when money market certificates ("MMCs") were created. 9
MMCs are nonnegotiable, interest-bearing financial instruments with a
higher interest rate than ordinary deposits.60 While the initial mini-
mum denomination for MMCs had been fifty million yen, subsequent
deregulation reduced the minimum denomination to thirty million yen
and in October, 1987, to ten million yen, progessively enlarging the
financial amount not subject to interest rate controls."'
Further deregulation of interest rate controls depends on two ma-
jor developments. First, an improved deposit insurance system for small
depositors must be introduced, in case too rapid a deregulation causes
higher funding costs for banks, leading to increased bank failures, espe-
cially among the smaller banks."2 Second, there must be a bureaucratic
reconciliation of competing bureaucratic interests between the MoF
and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications ("MPT"), which
has jurisdiction over the Postal Savings System ("PSS").6 ' Although
the MoF and MPT have been negotiating the liberalization of interest
rates on small denomination deposits and on the PSS savings certifi-
cates (teigaku), they failed to present legislation to the Diet aimed at
reforming current postal savings legislation,4
V. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE YEN
Prior to the Financial Accord, international demand for the yen as
a unit of account, 65 a medium of international payment,66 and a store
59. See id. § V(A)(2).
60. Id.
61. Deregulating Savings, JAPAN ECON. J., March 12, 1988, at 25.
62. Japan's Deposit Insurance Organization has a limited fund of 200 million yen
and a small staff. In order to bolster the deposit insurance system, the Financial Sys-
tem Research Council of Japan had recommended that the government increase the
level of insurable deposits from three to ten million yen, an amount which would fully
insure 90% of all depositors. See Research Council Goes for Rapid Liberalization,
ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, July 1985, at 8.
63. Semkow, The Deregulation of Japan's Financial Markets, INT'L FINANCIAL
L. REV., Aug. 1987, at 36. The PSS roughly has the same amount of deposits as all the
commercial banks, with over 116 trillion yen at the end of 1987, (an amount approach-
ing one trillion dollars in deposits). The PSS sets its own interest rates, which are
higher than those set by the MoF." See 1987 Postal Savings Hit Y1I6 Trillion, JAPAN
ECON. J., Jan. 16, 1988, at 16.
64. Ministries Delay Freeing of Small Deposit Rates, JAPAN ECON. J., March 19,
1988,' at 14.
65. A "unit of account" is an instrument that serves as the measure of the value
of obligations of the parties to an agreement. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FOR MULTINA-
TIONAL BUSINESS 504 (L.C. Nehart ed. 1967).
66. A currency is used as a "medium of payment" when it is actually used as an
19881
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of international value67 was surprisingly low in light of Japan's having
the second largest economy in the world. For instance, in January,
1984, only forty percent of Japan's exports and two to three percent of
its imports were denominated in yen, compared to other advanced
noncommunist countries in which sixty to seventy percent of exports
and forty to fifty percent of imports were denominated in the domestic
currency. 8
The Financial Accord provided several measures to international-
ize the yen, including the establishment of a yen-denominated bankers'
acceptance ("BA") market, the removal of restrictions on offshore yen
lending, and the liberalization of the Euroyen market.69 Each measure
was designed to increase the international demand for the yen vis-a-vis
other currencies, causing the yen to appreciate in value, especially since
interest rate deregulation would diminish capital outflows and reduce
the supply of yen internationally.
A yen-based BA market opened on June 1, 1985. Its creation was
designed to increase the demand for yen funds in trade financing by
permitting Japanese companies to settle trade transactions in low cost
yen funds, rather than using dollar loans from Japanese banks. ° In
addition, a BA market was expected to liberalize short-term prime
rates by promoting lending competition for the banks.7 1 For a number
of reasons, including the relatively high costs stemming from a stamp
duty levied on BA transactions, and preferred corporate practices of
settling in dollars for imports of raw materials, 72 the BA market was
virtually still-born, with outstanding balances of only ten to eleven bil-
lion yen. 3 It was only in October, 1987, that this market showed some
signs of life, with a small increase in balances attributable to a reduced
instrument of exchange between nations. See C.P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
MONEY: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 20 (1981).
67. A currency is used as a "store of value" when it is held as reserves. See id. at
17-20. This value is measured by the official foreign exchange reserve assets held by
governments and public organizations. Id.
68. See Yoshitomi, Adjusting the Yen to Japan's Role of International Creditor,
THE BANKER, Jan. 1984, at 90.
69. See FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § 5(A)(2) for Yen-Denominated BA
Market; id. § 5(A)(4), for the removal of restrictions on offshore yen lending; and id.
§ V(C) for the liberalization of The Euroyen market.
70. Yen-Based BA Market Expected to Help Internationalize Yen, JAPAN ECON.
J., June 4, 1985, at 24.
71. Id.
72. Semkow, supra note 63, at 36.
73. BA Outstanding Balance Higher," JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 21, 1987, at 19.
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stamp duty which became effective at that time.74
The elimination of many of the restrictions on offshore yen-lending
by Japanese and foreign banks on April 1, 1984,' 5 was designed to in-
crease the demand for the yen as a settlement and reserve currency.7 6
The restrictions eliminated by the MoF included those on loan ceilings,
interest rates, commissions, financing charges and currency swaps.
77
The MoF simultaneously relaxed restrictions on syndicated lending.78
Finally, the MoF liberalized the Euroyen market79 by, inter alia,
relaxing or removing restrictions on 1) the issuance of Euroyen bonds, 80
2) the issuance of Euroyen CDs,81 and 3) the lending of Euroyen. 2
Relaxing restrictions on Euroyen bonds has become a complicated
and ongoing process. Pursuant to the Financial Accord, the MoF ex-
panded the number of potential Euroyen bond issuers, once limited to a
select group of national governments and international financial institu-
tions, to include a limited number of Japanese corporations,8 3 and non-
Japanese corporations, state and local governments and government
agencies.8" In addition, the MoF relaxed requirements regarding the
size and number of issues, interest rates, maturity, currency and inter-
est rate swap features, underwriting fees and commissions and transfer-
ability, the selection of co-lead managers and the composition of under-
writing or selling groups as well as the domicile of distribution.85 More
74. Id.
75. See FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(A)(4).
76. Id.
77. See id. app. 1.
78. Id.
79. The Euroyen market is an international financial market in which yen-denom-
inated financial instruments are issued and managed outside Japan. See INTERNA-
TIONAL BANKING HANDBOOK 20 (W. Baugh & D. Mendick eds. 1984).
80. Euroyen bonds are long-term debt instruments denominated in yen and issued
and sold outside Japan. Id. at 10.
81. Euroyen CDs are yen-denominated CDs issued by banks outside Japan. Id.
82. Euroyen are yen deposited in and managed by banks outside Japan. Id.
83. On April 1, 1984, the MoF relaxed the eligibility criteria for domestic corpo-
rations and allowed private Japanese firms to issue Euroyen bonds. This liberalization
enabled 108 Japanese corporations to issue Euroyen convertible bonds. In addition, 30
Japanese firms were permitted to issue straight Euroyen bonds. All these firms have
excellent financial records. See 108 Companies Are Eligible to Issue Euroyen Con-
vertibles, JAPAN ECON. J., Apr. 3, 1984, at 1.
84. On December 1, 1984, the MoF relaxed the eligibility criteria for these enti-
ties. See R. JONES, RISING CONCERN IN TOKYO OVER YEN'S APPRECIATION, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE YEN/DOLLAR AGREEMENT 18 (1986).
85. Semkow, The 1984 American/Japanese Financial Agreement: Implications
and Results, 19 GEO. WASH. J. L. & ECON., 741, 780 (1985).
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important, the MoF removed the withholding tax on Euroyen bonds
issued by residents in April, 1985, a crucial area of contention, since
the hitherto continued imposition of the tax made Euroyen bonds is-
sued by residents less attractive than other Eurocurrency bonds, which
were not generally subject to a withholding tax.8" Moreover, in June,
1985, the MoF permitted non-residents to issue different types of
Euroyen bonds, including zero-coupon, floating rate, and dual cur-
rency87 Euroyen bond issues.88 These steps allowed the outstanding is-
sue of Euroyen bonds to increase substantially from Y70 billion in
1983 to Y1.587 trillion in 1985.89
Subsequent liberalization of the Euroyen bond market has fo-
cussed on easing the restrictions on the issuance of the bonds. In April,
1986, the criteria for the issuance of Euroyen bonds by foreign compa-
nies were relaxed, increasing the number of such companies from 150
to 210.90 Foreign companies need only have a credit rating of A or
better from one of five agencies, two foreign and three Japanese;
whereas at one time, they needed either a double A rating from Stan-
dard & Poor's, and Moody's Investor Services, or a single A rating
while meeting specific additional financial tests.91 In addition, a larger
number of Japanese companies may issue Euroyen bonds.92
Under the Financial Accord, the MoF also agreed to liberalize the
issuance of Euroyen CDs.93 Among the more important steps taken, the
MoF permitted foreign and Japanese banks to issue short-term negotia-
ble Euroyen CDs to nonresidents from bank offices outside Japan,94 and
permitted banks without branches or representative offices in Japan to
issue or purchase Euroyen CDs.95 Subsequent to the Financial Accord,
the MoF authorized banks to issue Euroyen CDs of six months or less
in December, 1984, and given the lack of market growth due to the
short, six-month maturity period, the MoF extended the maximum pe-
riod to one year in April, 1986.96 The Euroyen CD market, however,
86. Id. at 781.
87. Dual currency Euroyen bonds have yen-based subscription and interest pay-
ments and dollar-based principal redemption. See Semkow, supra note 63, at 36-37.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. H. TROUGHTON, JAPANESE FINANCE: THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 46, 51-
53 (Euromoney Publications, London 1986).
92. Id.
93. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(C)(4).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Semkow, supra note 63, at 36.
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has remained small, due, in large part, to the high issuance cost, and
the lack of underwriters due to an undeveloped secondary market.
97
The MoF also agreed to liberalize Euroyen lending.98 Pursuant to
the Financial Accord, the MoF in June, 1984, authorized foreign and
domestic banks to syndicate Euroyen loans to Japanese residents. This
measure enlarged the market accordingly since these banks had been
able to syndicate short-term Euroyen loans to non-residents since June,
1983. 99
VI. ACCESS OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Introduction
The Financial Accord, in large part, addressed the increasingly
important issue of liberalizing the access of foreign financial institu-
tions to financial markets in Japan. Since financial services are not
physical goods capable of being transported across borders, entry into a
country and its financial markets is necessary for foreign financial insti-
tutions to compete; otherwise, in most circumstances, financial services
can only be provided with extraordinary difficulty and costs, or not at
all.1"' Although the measures of the Financial Accord are relatively
modest in their scope, these and other subsequent measures represent
an important transition from an earlier period. Previously, Japanese fi-
nancial markets were relatively undeveloped, with only a few foreign
financial institutions with an insignificant market share. However, these
measures permitted Japanese finacial markets to move toward a more
developed financial market, becoming almost commensurate with those
of London and New York in the type and volume of financial transac-
tions, including hundreds of foreign financial institutions, with a cumu-
latively larger market share.
Under the Financial Accord, the MoF agreed to apply two princi-
ples in the treatment of foreign financial institutions. 101 First, the prin-
ciple of "national treatment" would be applied to foreign financial in-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Semkow, supra note 85, at 782-83.
100. A loan by a New York bank to a private borrower in Japan involves a finan-
cial service produced by residents of one country and sold to residents of another.
Without some physical presence in Japan to provide contact with the customer and
facilitate credit evaluation, such a transaction - while not impossible - would be ex-
traordinarily difficult. See I. WALTER, BARRIERS TO TRADE IN BANKING AND FINAN-
CIAL SERVICE 13, (Trade Policy Research Centre, London 1985).
101. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(B) Introduction.
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stitutions "engaged in existing and newly emerging financial business
areas" so that they would "be afforded equal competitive opportunity
with domestic firms." 102 Second, the principle of "transparency" would
be applied "toward entry into and operation in Japanese capital mar-
kets" so that foreign financial institutions would have "equal effective
opportunity."' 3 To further the first principle, the Financial Accord
sought 1) to enable foreign firms to join the Tokyo Stock Exchange; 2)
to permit foreign financial firms to participate in Japanese trust and
government securities markets; 3) to permit foreign financial firms to
participate in government securities markets; and 4) to abolish swap
limits on the conversion of foreign currencies into yen.104 To further the
second principle, the MoF agreed to provide financial institutions with
clear written guidelines and rule interpretations to ensure that both do-
mestic and foreign firms could compete in a more equal environment.10 5
The approach of "national treatment" is one of the major ap-
proaches taken toward the entry of foreign financial institutions in Ja-
pan; the other is reciprocity.' 06 The reciprocity approach means that
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. With respect to TSE memberships, see id. § V(B)(I); for entry into Japanese
trust banking, see id. § V(B)(2); for entry into government securities markets, see id.
§V(A)(4); and for the abolition of swap limits, see id. § V(A)(3). GOVERNMENT AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, THE MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN JAPAN 9, GAO, NSIAD-88-108BR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, [hereinafter MARKET
ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT], concurs with the Department of Treasury, which in its
National Treatment Study, 1986 Update, finds that the Japanese continue to observe
the commitments under the 1984 Yen/Dollar Agreement and generally provide na-
tional treatment for foreign banks. See DEPT. OF TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT
STUDY, 1986 UPDATE.
105. See FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(B)(3). According to the Gov-
ERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE YEN/DOLLAR AGREEMENT
23, GAO, NSIAD-86-107 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, JUNE 1986, transparency in Ja-
pan had improved, as rulings were sent to all foreign banks, and special meetings are
held to examine more complicated issues. Problems still arise, but these are recognized
to be more a result of misunderstandings rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead.
Id.
106. The reciprocity approach has been applied in a number of instances. In com-
mercial banking, which entails the taking of deposits and making of commercial loans,
the MoF has applied reciprocity in the examination of a foreign commercial bank's
application for a license. See Japan's National Study on Trade in Services, JAPAN
ECON. J., Oct. 1984, at 55. As stated in the Report of the Federation of the Banker's
Association of Japan, BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN (1982), "[ln actual application of
the law, the principle of reciprocity with the country from which the foreign bank
comes will be given more importance than anything else." See also Friesen, The Regu-
lation and Supervision of International Lending: Part 1, 19 INT'L LAW. 116 (1985).
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foreign financial institutions in Japan would be accorded the same
treatment as Japanese financial institutions in the foreign country with
respect to regulation and supervision as well as business powers. The
national treatment approach means that foreign financial institutions in
Japan are treated in the same way as the domestic financial institu-
tions. Because business powers and regulations affecting financial insti-
tutions vary among countries, the selection of approach is important.
This is notably applicable to the foreign financial institutions wishing to
enter Japan, and also to the MoF as Japan's primary financial regula-
tor, as it attempts to preserve its jurisdiction and its own schedule for
financial reform.
In principle, the financial institutions of the country which has a
more open and liberalized regulatory framework will favor the reci-
procity approach when locating in the country with the more restrictive
regulatory regime. They will receive greater business powers in the
more restrictive country under reciprocity than under national treat-
ment and if they can, through reciprocal access, "export" their wider
business powers to the country with the more restrictive regime. On the
other hand, the financial institutions of the more restrictive jurisdiction
will favor national treatment when locating in the country with the less
restrictive regime. They will receive greater business powers in the less
restrictive country under national treatment than under their more re-
strictive regimes at home.
The unevenness of regulatory regimes among the different coun-
tries, especially the differences in business powers, will lead to differ-
ences of opinion and some tension among the financial regulators. For
instance, the regulators in a more restrictive regime will resist the reci-
Other factors considered by the MoF are the financial strength and credit status of the
bank, the length of time the bank has had a representative office in Japan, and the
impact of the proposed branch in Japanese financial institutions. Id.
The reciprocity approach toward entry has been intended to encourage the country
in which the headquarters of foreign banks are domiciled to open its market. See Ja-
pan's National Study on Trade in Services, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 1984, at 55. For
instance, the MoF excluded direct participation by Canadian banks in Japan until Can-
ada's 1967 Bank Act had been revised in 1981 to permit Japanese and other foreign
banks to enter as Schedule B banks. Until this revision, Canadian banks had only rep-
resentative offices in Japan. See R. WRIGHT, A YEN FOR PROFIT: CANADIAN FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN 13 (Institute for Research on Public Policy 1987).
Foreign commercial banks, once licensed to do banking in Japan, are treated in
the same manner in large part as domestic commercial banks under the New Banking
Law (Ginkoho), Law No. 59 of 1981. For instance, when a foreign bank wishes to
establish a branch agency, the foreign bank like a domestic must obtain a banking
license from the MoF for each branch or agency as an independent bank. See Article
47, paragraph 1 and Article 4, Paragraph I of the New Banking Law.
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procity approach of the entering foreign financial institutions and their
sponsoring regulators and governments in order not to undermine its
carefully calibrated regulatory system, and timetable for reform. On
the other hand, the financial regulators in the less restrictive regime
may condition entry into its system upon business power reciprocity be-
ing granted by the regulators of the more restrictive regulatory regime.
Otherwise, the financial institutions from the more restrictive regimes
will have the benefit of greater business powers in the less restrictive
system while those from the less restricted country will be at a disad-
vantage in the more restrictive regime.
Since Japan has only begun to liberalize its rigidly compartmen-
talized financial services industry, which for the most part has a spe-
cialized type of financial institution for each different part of the finan-
cial market spectrum, 1°7 as a result, it has not reached the "universal
banking"10 regime of the type found in West Germany, France, Eng-
land, and those currently being implemented in Canada and Italy. Ja-
pan has a much more restrictive regime with respect to business pow-
ers. As a result, while well-diversified foreign financial institutions will
find the prospect of being granted narrower business powers under the
national treatment approach unattractive as compared to what full rec-
iprocity might entail, this modified entry is better than no entry at all.
107. There are five very important and major financial market segments which are
serviced by specialized types of financial institutions. The first is the taking of deposits
and making commercial loans according to tenor, or length of contract. Short-term
lending and taking of deposits are the province of the commercial banks, a category
comprised of city and regional banks, both of which are domestic Japanese financial
institutions, and foreign banks. Long-term lending and funding is the province of long-
term credit banks.
Second, trust banks engage in both trust and commercial banking, though they are
primarily engaged in the former. Trust banking involves the transfer of a right in prop-
erty from owner to trustee, or a trust bank, who administers or manages that property
on behalf of the hitherto owner, now a beneficiary. Third, the securities industry (or
interchangeably, the investment banking industry) engages in a number of primary and
secondary market activities, including the underwriting and distribution of government
debt, corporate debt and equity securities (a primary market activity), the trading on
the account of the firm in these securities in order to make a profit, as well as executing
trades qua broker on behalf of clients, both of which are secondary market activities.
Fourth, the pooling of risks occasioned by losses either through premature death, or by
accidental injury to persons or property is the business of the insurance industry. Fifth,
the investment advisory and management services industry provides investment advice
to and manages funds on behalf of clients.
108. "Universal banking" generally means financial institutions which can provide
all types of financial services, through either a bank or the bank and its various finan-
cial service subsidiaries.
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On the other hand, Japanese financial institutions with narrower pow-
ers at home find attractive the exercise of wider business powers abroad
under national treatment because they have the opportunity to learn
the other finacial service businesses they may eventually get at home. 109
B. Foreign Firms Joining the Tokyo Stock Exchange
Prior to the Financial Accord, foreign securities firms operating in
Tokyo were unable to obtain membership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange
("TSE") because no seats were available. "' Generally, this exclusion
worked a hardship because most foreign securities firms were unable to
finalize contracts, accept fees, or underwrite primary offerings of Japa-
nese securities.' Moreover, without a TSE seat, foreign securities
firms could not execute securities orders as brokerage agents without
paying twenty-seven percent of their commissions to TSE members to
formally execute the transactions." 2
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Working Group, the MoF
requested the TSE, an autonomous, nongovernmental body over which
it had no jurisdiction, to study potential methods of expanding mem-
bership opportunities for both domestic and foreign nonmember
firms." 3 In August, 1985, the TSE formally increased its membership
from eighty-three to ninety-three seats."' On November 29, 1985, the
TSE selected six foreign and four Japanese securities firms as new
members." 5 Although the price for each seat was a very high 1.2 bil-
109. Japanese Foreign District Investment, the Moneyman's Pursuit of Money,
The Economist, Mar. 5, 1988, at 83.
110. See MoF Decides to Allow Foreign Members to TSE, JAPAN ECON. J., May
28, 1985, at 4; and, Browinging and Chipello, Non-Japanese Firms Begin Push to Win
Seats on Tokyo Exchange, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 27. The TSE, which had been
founded on April 1, 1949, opened up membership to foreign firms in April, 1982, by
deleting constitutional provisions against foreign membership. See MARKET ACCESS
CONCERNS REPORT, supra note 104, at 13.
111. Thomas, "Capital Formation in Japan and the United States: A Compara-
tive Assessment, 21 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 227, 234 (1983). These restrictions ap-
plied to the majority of foreign brokerages that operated representative offices in Japan.
In order to provide full operations, foreign firms first had to obtain a license from the
MoF to operate a branch office and then had to maintain a large staff to meet the
MoF's reporting requirements. As of 1983, only three foreign firms had sought branch
status. See id at 234.
112. Browning, Tokyo Exchange: To Join or Not to Join, Wall St. J., Sept. 27,
1985, at 32.
113. FINANCIAL ACCORD supra, note 11, § V(B).
114. Tokyo Stock Exchange to Accept Foreign Members as It Adds 10 Seats,
JAPAN ECON. J., Sept. 7, 1985, at 1.
115. Browning, Tokyo Bourse Grants Seats to 6 Foreigners, Wall St. J., Dec. 2,
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lion yen, each new member could, with sufficiently high trading
volumes, save on the commissions previously' paid to Japanese members
to formally execute trades." 6
Despite the increased number of TSE seats, the governments of,
and some licensed securities firms from, the United States and Europe
began applying pressure for an additional increase in membership. 1 7 In
December, 1986, the TSE announced plans to expand membership and
admit more foreign members when an annex to the TSE's main build-
ing was completed'" and the computer systems were upgraded in the
Spring of 1988.11 Despite this schedule, in April, 1987, the U.K. Gov-
ernment threatened to revoke the licenses of Japanese banks and insur-
ance companies operating in the U.K. under the provisions of the Fi-
nancial Services Act of 1986, unless the Japanese admitted three U.K.
securities firms by May or June of 1987.120 This dispute was resolved in
June, 1987, when the Japanese finance officials agreed to accelerate
their review of TSE memberships to enable U.K. applicants to join in
1988.121
1985, at 25.
116. Semkow, supra note 63.
117. The number of foreign securities firms in Japan had increased from 14 in
1985 to 36 at the end of March, 1987, with 14 from the United Kingdom, 12 from the
United States, five from West Germany, two apiece from Switzerland and France, and
one from the Netherlands. See Makino, TSE's Widening Gates Buttered by Foreign
Firms Seeking Entrance, JAPAN EcON. J., Apr. 18, 1987, at 1. American pressure
arose when in December, 1986, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York granted the
applications of two Japanese securities firms, Nomura Securities Co. and Daiwa Secur-
ities Co., to become primary dealers in government securities, and approved the acqui-
sition of Aubrey G. Lanston & Co., another extant primary dealer, by the Industrial
Bank of Japan. See Sesit & Herman, 'Fed to Designate Several Japanese Firms as
Primary Bond Dealers,' Sources Say, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1986, at 2.
118. TSE Decides to Expand Membership, JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 27, 1986, at 1.
i19. Tokyo Market to Offer More Seais iu Foreign Firms by Nexi Muy, Abia
Wall St. J. Wkly, May 18, 1987, at 10. According to TSE officials, the lack of floor
space prevented any additional membership at this time because the TSE's stock trad-
ing procedures required that its members be physically present on the trading floor
rather than linked electronically to the exchange. See MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS RE-
PORT, supra note 104, at 13.
120. Japan Snubs UK over Brokers Plan, Financial Times, Apr. 9, 1987, at 26.
Under the reciprocity provisions of the Financial Services Act, 1986, Ch. 60, namely,
§§ 183-186 of Part IX, the Secretary of State or the Treasury may, if it is in the
national interest, revoke or restrict the licenses of foreign banks, insurance companies,
and investment businesses if the laws of their country, or the actions taken by its gov-
ernment or any governmental body do not permit British enterprises from carrying on
similar business on terms as favorable as carrying them on in the United Kingdom.
121. Lascelles, Japan to Speed Review of Exchange Membership, id., June 3,
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In October, 1987, the TSE announced it would admit twenty-two
more members to the TSE before the end of 1987, bringing the total
number of seats to 114.122 The criteria used in awarding seats would
include an evaluation of the broker's assets and the degree of their par-
ticipation on the exchange.123 Having accepted applications in the pre-
vious month,124 on December 16, 1987, the TSE announced the names
of the new members, sixteen of which were from five foreign coun-
tries. 125 The President of the TSE mentioned that the new members
were selected "on the basis of their business scale, performance and
history of operation in Japan and financial conditions."12 The new
members paid about 1.2 billion yen for their memberships, which be-
came effective in May, 1988.127
C. Trust Banking
Despite the MoF's rejection of the proposed merger between
Nomura and Morgan Guaranty Trust Bank to enter trust banking, the
MoF announced under the Financial Accord its new policy to license
qualified foreign banks to participate in the same range of trust bank-
ing activities performed by Japanese trust banks. 2 ' In doing so, the
MoF provided foreign commercial banks wider business powers than
their domestic counterparts.
1987, at 7. The TSE also was able to computerize between 50 and 100 of its most
actively traded stocks, which removed the need for floor traders in these stocks and
opened up space for additional members. See MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT,
supra note 104, at 13.
122. An earlier merger between Toishi Securities Co. and Taiyo Securities Co.
brought the number of seats to 92. Tokyo Bourse Members Increase by 22, JAPAN
ECON. J., Oct. 24, 1987, at 13.
123. TSE to Admit 20 New Members, Financial Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at 22.
124. Foreign Cos. to Dominate 22 Seats Added by the TSE, JAPAN ECON. J.,
Oct. 31, 1987, at 3, 26.
125. The foreign firms according to country were: 1) United States - First Boston
(Asia) Ltd., Kidder Peabody International Corp., Prudential-Bache Securities (Japan)
Ltd., Shearson Lehman Brothers Asia Inc., Smith Barney, Harris Upham International
Inc., and Salomon Brothers Asia Ltd.; 2) United Kingdom - Baring Securities Ltd.,
County Nat West Securities Japan Ltd., Kleinwort Benson International Inc. and
Schroeder Securities (Japan) Ltd.; 3) West Germany - DB Capital Markets (Asia)
Ltd. and Dresdner - ABD Securities Ltd.; 4) Switzerland -SBCI Securities (Asia) Ltd.
and UBS Phillips & Drew International Ltd.; 5) France - Sogen Securities (North
Pacific) Ltd. and W.I. Carr (Overseas) Ltd. Tokyo Stock Exchange Names New
Members, id. Dec. 26, 1987, at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(B)(2).
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The MoF mentioned that participation could include partnership
with Japanese trust banks, but not with non-licensed firms,129 an ap-
proach that purportedly reinforced the historical separation in Japan
between trust and commercial banking.' 3 0 The new policy, however,
was due in part to the U.S. Government's authorization of nine Japa-
nese banks to enter the trust business in the United States. 13 1
The MoF established criteria for the entry of foreign trust banks,
including that the foreign banks be engaged in the trust business in
their home country, and have an asset balance exceeding the average
balance of Japanese trust banks. 3 2 Although the MoF originally in-
tended to restrict the number of foreign trust banks to eight, one for
each of the eight Japanese trust banks, the MoF accepted all nine ap-
plications in June, 1985."'
Foreign trust bank entry has been timely, in large part, due to the
growing pension needs of Japan's more rapidly aging and longer-living
population.13 ' Pension fund growth has been substantial, growing on
average over twenty percent per year, with public and private sector
funds amounting to over $200 billion in 1985.131 Moreover, the man-
agement of corporate pension trusts, which have grown from Y10 tril-
lion in 1983 to Y20 trillion in 1986, is expected to grow to Y60 trillion
by 1990.136 Trust banks and insurance companies, so far, have had ex-
clusive management over pension funds."31 The foreign trust banks
have had some limited success with the corporate pension trust market,
amounting, however, to only .1% of that of domestic trust banks.1 3 8
However, these foreign trust banks have established a strong presence
in foreign currency dominated trust funds, which involve the manage-
ment of U.S. stocks on behalf of individuals, and also specified money
129. Id.
130. In the United States, national commercial banks undertook trust banking
pursuant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and Federal Reserve Board regulations
which were promulgated in 1915. State commercial banks were able to engage in this
activity earlier. See W. A. LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 138
(1984).
131. Only U.S. Banks Acting on Their Own Can Enter Japan's Trust Market:
BoJ, JAPAN ECON. J., May 8, 1984, at 1.
132. 9 Foreign Banks Allowed into Trust Banking Field, id. July 1, 1985, at 1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Survey of Investment Management, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1986, at 4.
136. Semkow, supra note 63, at 35.
137. Marsh, Japan's Next Export Success: The Financial Services Industry, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1986, at 63.
138. Foreign Trust Banks Bolster Japan Presence, JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 29,
1987.
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in trust, of which the investor directs the management."3 9
D. Government Bond Trading
Under the Financial Accord, the MoF announced that on June 1,
1984, qualified Japanese banks will be able to buy and sell government
securities to the secondary market,14 0 an activity hitherto undertaken
primarily by securities firms, and that within months, qualified Japa-
nese branches of foreign banks could do the same.' 41 In October, 1984,
the MoF licensed Citibank, Bank of America, and Chase Manhattan to
trade previously-issued government securities in Japan. 142
Subsequent to the Financial Accord, the MoF further liberalized
the role of foreign financial institutions in the underwriting of govern-
ment securities.' 43 The problem was that the foreign financial institu-
tions had a very limited role in the government underwriting syndicate,
under which members were allocated bonds through a set formula. This
syndicate was comprised of approximately 800 financial institutions, in-
cluding as of April, 1987, twelve U.S. banks and twelve U.S. securities
firms.144 In April, 1987, the allotment of ten-year bonds underwritten
by foreign securities was increased from .3 to over one percent. 14
Moreover, in November, 1987, a limited "auction" had been intro-
duced for twenty percent of each ten-year bond issue, under which bids
on the volume of bonds were made and accepted by the MoF prior to
the conclusion of negotiations on terms and conditions of the forthcom-
139. Foreign Banks Expand Fund Trusts, id. Mar. 21, 1987, at 3.
140. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(A)(Interest Rates)(4).
141. Id.
142. Three U.S. Banks to be Allowed to Deal in Japanese Treasury Bonds, JA-
PAN ECON. J., Oct. 2, 1984, at 3.
143. In response to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York granting primary
dealer status to the subsidiaries of two Japanese securities firms as discussed id., the
MoF announced in December, 1986, to undertake three additional measures to liber-
alize Japanese financial markets. Two of these measures dealt with the underwriting of
medium-term and long-term government bonds respectively which are discussed above;
see notes 140 to 149 and the accompanying text. The other measure dealt with the
granting of securities licenses to subsidiaries of U.S. banks. See Mid-Term Gov't Bonds
Open Bids Among Market Opening Moves, JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 27, 1986, at 2. At
this time, 25 foreign banks and 17 foreign securities firms were part of the syndicate
that could underwrite long-term and medium-term bonds, having increasing in number
from nine foreign banks and six foreign securities firms since 1984, the year foreign
financial institutions were first permitted to underwrite these bonds. See Japanese
Bonds - Yearning to Breathe Free, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1986, at 93-94.
144. MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT, supra note 104, at 16.
145. Id.
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ing bond issue.1 6 Under this scheme, foreign institutions increased
their share of November, 1987, ten-year issues from 1.5 to about five
percent.147
In addition, the MoF switched from an underwriting syndicate to
a public auction for twenty-year government bonds in August, 1987.148
Unfortunately, the twenty-year government bonds comprise less than
five percent of newly issued government bonds.'49
E. Elimination of Swap Limits
The Financial Accord also addressed restrictions on the conversion
of foreign currencies into yen.' Prior to the effective date of the Fi-
nancial Accord, foreign banks operating in Japan were unable to easily
raise sufficient funds for loans, in large part due to the paucity of
branches per foreign bank as a means of gathering retail deposits. 5 ' In
order to raise more funds, foreign bank subsidiaries would convert into
yen foreign currency obtained from their offshore parents.1 52 The Bank
of Japan, however, imposed swap limits on the foreign currency that
could be converted into yen.' 53 Although originally intended to insulate
foreign exchange and domestic interests rates from undesirable fluctua-
tions caused by unlimited conversions, the swap limits constrained the
foreign banks' ability to raise funds. In an effort to promote interna-
146. MoF to Up Non-Competitive Bids for 10-Year Government Bonds, JAPAN
EcON. J., May 30, 1987, at 2.
147. MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT, supra note 104, at 16.
148. Shibata, Tokyo Adopts Auction for Bond Issue, Financial Times, May 19,
1987, at 29; see also MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT, supra note 104, at 15 n.7.
149. In the fiscal year ended March 31, 1986, Japan sold $155.94 billion in gov-
ernment debt securities, 76.6% of which was in 10-year bonds and 4.6% in 20-year
government bonds. See Seiset, Japanese Plan Auction Sale of Some Bonds, Wall St.
J., May 13, 1987, at 29. Japanese government bonds are issued through an auction, an
underwriting syndicate, and by direct placement with official accounts such as the
Trust Fund Bureau and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. In 1987, about
29% of all government bonds were issued through an auction and about 37% placed in
official accounts. See MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS REPORT, supra note 104, at 15 n.7.
Public auction also extend to medium-term bonds of up to four years' maturity. See
Shibata, supra note 148.
150. Financial Accord, supra note 11, § V(3).
151. In November, 1983, there were 74 foreign banks in Japan, operating through
102 branches. Japanese Banks - Their Type and Functions, JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 6,
1983, at 37. As of March 31, 1986 there were 77 foreign banks operating through 112
branches. Nakamura, Is There Any Future for Foreign Banks in Japan?, Tokyo Bus.
Today, Sept. 1986, at 43.
152. BRONTE, JAPANESE FINANCE: MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 70 (1983).
153'. Id.
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tional capital flows, the MoF announced pursuant to the Financial Ac-
cord, that effective June 1, 1984, swap limits would be abolished for
foreign and Japanese banks."'
F. Foreign Securities Firms and Commercial Banks
Another area in which the Japanese have bowed to the foreign
pressures for reciprocal access, rather than national treatment, is the
recent granting of securities licenses to foreign commercial banks, and
in the case of Citibank, through its securities subsidiary in Japan, a
seat on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. These business powers are more
extensive than those currently enjoyed by the domestic Japanese banks
which only have limited securities powers beyond underwriting and
trading in government securities.
Pursuant to the Law on Foreign Securities Firms, in 1972 the
MoF started granting securities licenses to foreign financial institu-
tions, with ten granted between 1972 and 1984, and another eighteen
by October, 1986.155 While this law permitted foreign bank owned
companies to do business with Japan, provided that they were doing
business in their home countries or elsewhere for more than three years
and the parent's interest was not greater than fifty percent, the MoF
blocked the application of this rule through administrative guidance
until December, 1985, when DeutscheBank obtained a securities license
for a securities branch in Japan, effective only so long as it was half-
owned by a non-financial institution. 6 By June, 1987, ten other for-
eign banks, all from universal banking regimes in which Japanese com-
mercial banks could undertake a broad range of securities activities,
had successfully argued that on the basis of reciprocal access that they
should be granted securities licenses. 157 At this time, the MoF tenta-
tively approved securities licenses for ten more foreign institutions, in-
cluding subsidiaries of four U.S. banks, with J.P. Morgan Securities
(Asia) Ltd., the first U.S. affiliated institution to receive a license," 8 to
154. FINANCIAL ACCORD, supra note 11, § V(A)(4).
155. Finance Ministry OKs 8 Offices for Europe Banks, Securities Firms, JAPAN
ECON. J., Nov. 15, 1986, at 2.
156. Initially, DeutscheBank asked the MoF to open a branch of a wholly-owned
subsidiary in light of Japanese financial institutions being able to do the same under
the broader business powers regime of universal banking in West Germany. See For-
eign Bank-Owned Securities Firms to be Allowed to Set up Branches, id., Oct. 12,
1985, at 1.
157. H. TROUGHTON, JAPANESE FINANCE: THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 89
(1986).
158. MoF: J.P. Morgan Okay to Run Securities Firm, JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 22,
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underwrite, distribute, trade and broker debt and equity securities.' 59
American banks that had acquired existing British securities firms
in Japan, however, preceded the American banks which entered de
novo, and in the case of Citibank, preceded all foreign banks. 6 ' Ci-
tibank acquired Vickers de Costa Ltd., a British securities firm which
had been operating in Japan prior to the DeutscheBank application,
and which had been among the first of the six foreign financial institu-
tions to acquire a seat on the Tokyo Stock Exchange on November 19,
1985.111 The MoF considered the Vickers case an exception to the ex-
isting ban on banks entering the securities industry because to have
excluded Citicorp would have meant the discontinuation of Vicker's ex-
isting business in Japan.' 2 In addition, Security Pacific opened a secur-
ities branch through Hoare Grovett Ltd., and Chase Manhattan
through Laurie Milbank.' 63
The interesting implication of the U.S. bank entry into the securi-
ties business, either by de novo entry or by acquisition, is that the MoF
adopted a policy of equal treatment of foreign financial institutions in
Japan, changing the past policy of reciprocity with respect to certain
universal banking countries, the banking institutions of which were able
to gain access to Japan's securities market, and further exacerbating
the discrepancy in business powers between what the domestic and for-
eign commercial banks can do in Japan. When DeutscheBank applied
for a securities license, arguments were made that it would be unfair
for the MoF to deny this application since the Japanese banks with
branches and subsidiaries in West Germany could avail themselves of
the power of universal banks in that country in both commercial and
investment banking. With the granting of the DeutscheBank applica-
tion, financial institutions from countries with universal banking re-
gimes made similar applications, and a policy of reciprocity was
1987, at 18.
159. Horowitz, Banks Win Securities Nod, AMERICAN BANKER, June 4, 1987, at
1. Until this time, U.S. banks in Japan could trade in some securities, but were con-
fined to dealing with the 120 largest Japanese financial institutions, and had neither
retail customers nor corporations. With a securities license, these foreign financial insti-
tutions have a broader distribution base to market foreign as well as domestic yen
securities. See Seiset & Rubinfein, Japan Signals Entry for Banks into Securities,
Wall St. J., June 4, 1987, at 3.
160. See Semkow, supra note 85, at 770 n.232.
161. Id.
162. See Foreign Bank-Owned Securities Firms to be Allowed to Set-Up
Branches, supra note 156.
163. Chipello, Japan Gives Broker Permits to 8 Europe-Based Firms, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 18, 1986, at 28.
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adopted in granting securities licenses to financial institutions of these
countries.
The entry of American financial institutions, however, could not be
rationalized on the basis of reciprocity since the Glass-Steagall Act
provisions separate commercial and investment banking. American en-
try by acquisition was accepted because to do otherwise would mean
discontinuing an extant and viable operation of foreign financial insti-
tutions in Japan, a policy that would be fraught with political peril
given the issue of greater access of foreign financial institutions to Ja-
pan. The de novo entry of the American banks, however, marked a new
phase regarding the issue of greater entry of U.S. and other foreign
financial institutions. It is unlikely, however, that this new phase will
apply to financial institutions of other foreign countries. The American
financial market is the most important financial market in which Japa-
nese financial institutions can grow. Moreover, the MoF has taken
measured steps to assuage American legislators who have introduced
amendments to pending trade legislation that would preclude entry into
the United States if similar access is not granted to American financial
institutions in the foreign country."'
While a growing number of foreign financial institutions can now
engage in both commercial and banking activities, the separation of
investment and commercial banking by Article 65 of the Securities and
Exchange Law ("SEL") 165 for domestic financial institutions in Japan
has come under attack from Japanese commercial banks."6 Japanese
banks, which are precluded by the Anti-Monopoly Law167 from owning
more than five percent of a securities firm, have been concerned about
foreign bank entry into the securities business. 6 ' The Industrial Bank
164. Earlier in the year, both the House and the Senate each passed omnibus
trade legislation that had reciprocity provisions aimed at countries which restricted ac-
cess to their financial markets. The House bill, given the Schumer Amendment, would
deny primary dealer status to foreign firms if their own countries restrict U.S. entities
from equal access to their markets within six months. The Senate bill contained a simi-
lar amendment, except that it required equal access within two years and would ex-
empt institutions from countries that have or are negotiating free trade agreements
with the United States. See Langley & Sesit, Panel Votes to Curb Japanese Dealings
in U.S. Securities, Wall St. J., May 21, 1987, at 18.
165. Securities and Exchange Law [Shoken Torihiki Ho], Law No. 25 of 1948, as
amended by the 1981 Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law [Shoken
Torihiki-ho no lchibu o Kaisei suru Horitsu], Law No. 62 of 1981.
166. See infra note 171, at 1, 6.
167. Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade Law, Law
No. 54 (1947). For further discussion of this law, see IYORI & UESUGI, THE AN-
TIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN (1983).
168. Sulkin, New Lanston Office in Tokyo Irks Japan Securities Firms, Asian
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of Japan, however, circumvented these restrictions recently when its
New York subsidiary, Aubrey G. Lanston & Co., one of forty primary
dealers in U.S. government securities, the activities of which are lim-
ited to providing advice and information, was permitted to open a se-
curities representative office in Japan."A9 Although MoF officials con-
sider Lanston a special case,171 the question remains whether Lanston
represents ultimately a transitional case by which the repatriation of
foreign securities subsidiaries of Japanese banks will lead to the even-
tual demise of Article 65 of the SEL.1
7 1
G. Foreign Investment Advisory and Management Services Firms
Foreign investment advisory and management service firms have
fared very well in the newly emerging and regulated investment advi-
sory and management industry in Japan. This industry provides advice
to and manages funds on behalf of clients, earning fees in the process
for such services.
In May, 1986, Japan enacted the Law for Regulating Securities
Investment Advisory Business (hereinafter "LRSIAB"), which took ef-
fect on November 25, 1986.172 The purpose of the LRSIAB is to pro-
tect investors "by a system of registering persons who are engaged in
the business of providing securities advice and necessary regulation of
their such business. 173
Under the provisions of the LRSIAB, all firms wishing to engage
in the investment advisory business of providing advice to a customer
under an investment advisory contract must register with the MoF in
order to become an investment adviser.174 The registration require-
ments for Japan's investment advisers, which are dominated by a small
number of major advisors, most of which are subsidiaries of stock bro-
Wall St. J. Wkly, July 27, 1987, at 20.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The city banks have tried to overcome these legislative restrictions in other
ways, such as seconding their employees to the securities firm affiliate, having the of-
fices of the securities affiliate in close proximity to the bank's offices, or in networking
securities business through its affiliate. See Takahashi, Japanese Banks Using Affiliates
to Muscle in on Securities Field, JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 5, 1987, at 1, 6.
172. Law For Regulating Securities Investment Advisory Business, Law No. 74 of
May 27, 1986 [hereinafter "Law No. 74"].
173. Art. 1, Law No. 74, id. The LRSIAB was prompted by Japan's worst case of
securities fraud, the 1983-1984 Toshi Journal scandal, when 8000 small savers lost
Y18.4 billion. Why Japan is Worshipping Foreign Fund Managers, THE ECONOMIST,
Mar. 7, 1987, at 79.
174. See Semkow, supra note 63, at 38.
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kerages, banks and insurance companies, are easy with which to
comply.175
The licensing requirements for those investment advisers who wish
to engage in the discretionary investment business are more difficult
with which to comply. This business involves granting an investment
adviser the discretionary powers necessary to make investment judg-
ments in whole or in part, on the basis of its analysis of the value of a
security and make an investment on behalf, and for the account, of its
customer.17
Only trust banks and insurance companies could manage discre-
tionary accounts prior to the passage of the LRSIAB. 177 Under its pro-
visions, the MoF will grant licenses to those investment advisers which
have a strong financial base and personnel with an adequate level of
expertise and experience to carry out this type of business. 178 Guide-
lines released in February, 1987, required that discretionary manage-
ment license holders will be required to have a minimum capital of
Y1OO million in equity capital, and in excess of Y20 billion in managed
or entrusted assets by their third year of operation.1 79 One shortcoming
of the LRSIAB, however, has been the exclusion of management of
corporate pension funds from its provisions, an activity that is the ex-
clusive province of trust banks and insurance companies. 8 '
175. Id.
176. Law No. 74, supra note 172, Art. 2.
177. Semkow, supra note 63, at 36.
178. Discretionary Account Firms Must Keep Y20 Billion Assets, JAPAN ECON.
J., Feb. 14, 1987, at 2.
179. Id.
180. Dixon & Bruce, UK Welcomes Tokyo Decision to Open Fund Managment
Market, Financial Times, May 27, 1987, at 28. There are some undercurrents for re-
form of the current practices pension fund management. In July, 1987, an advisory
body of the Ministry of Health and Welfare recommended expanding the scope of
pension fund management. In January, 1988, the Japan Securities Investment Advisors
submitted a report to the MoF and Ministry of Health and Welfare, describing current
corporate pension management practices lagging behind that of the U.S. and Europe
by 20 years, and called for the elimination of the monopoly over corporate pension fund
management by the trust banks and life insurance companies. See Takahashi, Invest-
ment Advisors Challenge Pension Management Monopoly, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 6,
1988, at 2. The MoF is currently planning in 1988 to relax restrictions on the manag-
ment of public pension funds, which are currently managed by the Fund Trust Bureau
of the MoF, in order to permit part of these funds to be invested in money market
instruments under the managment of life insurance companies and trust banks. See
Investment Advisers Want Pension Business," id. Jan. 23, 1988, at 5. In addition, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare has introduced draft legislation that would permit city
banks and securities firms to provide advisory services to corporate fund managers on
the management of pension funds. See Banks, Securities Firms Get OK to Handle
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Under the LRSIAB, the investment advisory industry had grown
quickly with 273 firms having registered with the MoF as of August
31, 1987. i1 On February 20, 1987, 135 successful firms, including
forty-four banks, seventeen insurance companies, twenty-four securities
companies and sixteen foreign firms were granted registrations;182 all of
these applied before the deadline of December 2, 1986.183 Of this
group, the MoF granted in May, 1987, fifty-nine discretionary invest-
ment licenses, seventeen of which were foreign registrants, including
ten from the U.K. and six from the U.S.A."" The new licensees have
been authorized to commence business since June, 1987.185 New discre-
tionary investment licenses will be granted later from the pool of suc-
cessful subsequent registrants.
In February, 1987, the MoF published guidelines for awarding li-
censes to discretionary investment firms."8 6 The rules pertaining to for-
eign firms have been substantially relaxed. For instance, foreign firms
need not comply with the condition that they must have Y20 billion in
managed assets by their third year of operation, as long as their parent
company has over YOO billion in managed assets.187 Moreover, initial
concerns that the foreign parent and its subsidiary would each have to
apply for a license, as well as certain staffing requirements designed to
keep the subsidiary at arm's length from the parent company were sub-
sequently relaxed by supplementary rules issued March 2, 1987.188 In
addition, the trade body of the investment advisory and management
industry, the Japan Securities Investment Advisors Association, which
was established on September 22, 1987,189 has, by dint of the MoF, a
foreign firm on its steering committee, a significant honor in Japan. 190
Pensions, id. Feb. 13, 1988, at 12.
181. Takahashi, Investment Advisory Group of 223 Firms Starts to Halt Fraudu-
lent Practices, id. Oct. 3, 1987, at 2.
182. 135 Firms Registered as Investment Advisers, id. Mar. 31, 1987, at 3.
183. Why Japan is Worshipping Foreign Fund Managers, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
7, 1987, at 80.
184. The remaining licenses were granted to 14 security company subsidiaries, 12
city banks, two long-term credit banks, nine insurance companies and two others. See
Dixon, Rodger & Bruce, UK Welcomes Tokyo Decision to Open Fund Management
Market, Financial Times, May 27, 1987, at 28. See also 17 Foreign Firms into Discre-
tion Managment, JAPAN ECON. J., May 30, 1987, at 2.
185. Japan Econ. J., supra note 184.
186. Id.
187. Discretionary Account Firms Must Keep Y20 Bil. Assets," id. Feb. 14, 1987,
at 2.
188. Why Japan is Worshipping Foreign Fund Managers, supra note 183.
189. Tokahashi, supra note 181.
190. Why Japan is Worshipping Foreign Fund Managers, supra note 183.
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The liberal treatment of foreign firms in the investment advisory
and management industry is perhaps due for a few reasons. For in-
stance, Japan's current account surpluses have grown rapidly recently,
permitting unprecedented capital outflows to be invested in foreign as-
sets, including debt and equity securities of foreign corporations and
debt equities of foreign governments. If Japan is to emerge as an inter-
national financial center commensurate with its emerging role as the
world's foremost rentier nation, foreign firms with specific expertise in
managing these types of assets in their own countries will be needed., 9 '
In addition, fund management in Japan is not as well developed as
it is abroad, particularly compared with that of the U.S. and the
U.K.'92 In Japan, there are several types of funds, which are managed
by different financial institutions; security companies handle investment
trust funds; life insurance companies and trust banks handle pension
funds; and investment advisory companies handle funds for individu-
als. 193 These funds are managed very much like high-interest rate de-
posit accounts, informally offering an ensured return, rather than using
active investment management techniques to outperform the total mar-
ket indices.' 94 For instance, most Japanese pension fund managers offer
returns on investments within half a percentage point of each other, 19 5
a result which suggests the industry is like a cartel, with set returns,
which is in need of foreign competition.19
191. Investment Management, on Top of the World, a Survey, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 8, 1986, at 4, 24, 25.




195. The Japan Pension Fund Association, which is attempting to get more active
performance measurements, has estimated that in 1985, 90% of all pension funds re-
ported an investment return of between 9.28% and 9.7%, despite being invested in
different stocks. See Investment Management, on Top of the World, a Survey, supra
note 191. On the other hand, active fund management may not yield significant divi-
dends net of the costs of active management, i.e., commissions for buying and selling
financial instruments and salaries of analysts to ascertain which financial instruments
yield a higher amount for a given level of risk, because it is difficult to outperform
broad-based market indices. For instance, SEI Funds Evaluation Services, a pension
fund consultant, claimed that the S&P 500 index outperformed 87% of all managers
in the decade ending in 1979 and 66 2/% for the decade ending in 1982. Moreover, the
same consultant estimated that the S&P index outperformed 64% of all pension ac-
counts in 1983, 75% of these accounts in 1984, and 66% in 1985. See BEVIS LONG-
STRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 9 n.1.
(1986).
196. Id. at 22-24.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The restructuring of the Japanese financial markets and industry
neither began nor ended with the Financial Accord and the other con-
sistent measures in its train.'97 However, these are significant in that
they represent primarily an American perception that by restructuring
the financial industry and market, the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance
could be resolved. These measures had two prongs: 1) like trade conflict
over autos, citrus, beef, government contracts and so on, greater access
to the financial industry by foreign companies was sought; 2) unlike
these other industries, restructuring the financial services industry and
its related markets for financial services and instruments affected the
yen/dollar exchange rate.
The complexity of the dynamics underlying the trade adjustment
process, however, has deferred the remedial effects of these measures.
The irony lies in the fact that Japan's continued position as America's
largest trade creditor has now been parlayed into that of America's
largest investor.
197. For instance, in December, 1987, the MoF received a report from the Finan-
cial System Subcomittee of the Financial System Research Council, a consultative
body to the MoF. The Report called for a drastic overhaul of Japan postwar banking
system. See Ministry Set to Alter Postwar Bank System, JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 12,
1987, at 14.
